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State governments react to policy problems in very different ways. This study was 
conducted to examine if the model of political culture as developed by Daniel J. Elazar can 
be beneficial in explaining the differences in state administrative procedure acts. Elazar's 
model presents a triad of moralistic, individualistic, and traditionalistic political cultures 
that dominate the American governmental system. Each state is categorized under the most 
dominate political culture as determined by migration streams during the settkment of the 
' ' ~···· • >, r 
states. Citing the comparative study of state administrative procedure acts published by 
Patty Renfrow and David Houston, this study examines the scale of statute restrictiveness 
for each state when grouped by political culture. Similarly, the year in which each state 
passed an administrative procedure statute is examined through the guidelines ofElazar's 
model of political culture. The results of this study reflect intriguing relationships between 
states with similar political cultures. Moralistic states tend to be the most innovative as 
predicted by Elazar' s model. Not only do these states score the highest on the scale of 
statute restrictiveness, but they also are among the first states to adopt an administrative 
procedure act. Traditionalistic states are expected to be the least innovative and the least 
likely to promote popular involvement in government. The data for traditionalistic states 
shows that these states score the lowest on the scale of statute restrictiveness and tend to be 
among the last of the states to pass administrative procedure acts. Attempts to nationalize 
state administrative law policy such as the Model State Administrative Procedure Act have 
not produced the intended results of those seeking uniform policy among the states. This 
study shows that the continued variations in administrative policies within the states can be 
explained through political culture. 
Accepted by: --------------~----------~Chrur 
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A debate regarding the merits of federalism with regards to the constitutional 
theory of the founding generation in the 21'1 century is rarely given serious discussion 
in political science departments in American universities. Nevertheless, this study will 
seek to show whether or not different political cultures within the United States have an 
influence on administrative and regulatory processes. There is a widespread belief that 
centralization through cooperative federalism and creative federalism by way of New 
Deal and Great Society policies respectively, has compelled states towards the 
amalgamation of bureaucratic processes leaving the foundation of American political 
philosophy obsolete in modem government. The Administrative Procedure Acts as 
passed by each of the fifty states are further examined through Daniel Elazar' s 
framework of political cultures in an effort to discuss the utility of federalism in 
modem government. 
Political culture explained 
Daniel Elazar's work on political culture has received praise and criticism 
among the academic community. His original work on this topic is described first in 
Cities of the Prairie published in 1970 and later expounded in American Federalism: A 
view from the states. Elazar conceptualized three dominant political subcultures within ,. 
the American governmental system. Political culture is defined as being the "particular 
pattern of orientation to political action in which each political system is embedded 
(Elazar 1970)." The three classifications of political culture are defmed by specific 
models of political behavior that are innate in the local society and have roots in the 
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original groups that settled the regwn. Elazar focuses exclusively on religious 
affiliation using census data from the early I 900's and projections of migration streams 
that eventually matriculated from the east to the west. A study from Morgan and 
Watson used more recent census data and has shown the staying power of religious 
affiliation and the stability of regional ties, a point that benefits one who seeks utility in 
Elazar's political culture model (Morgan and Watson, 1991). Table 1 shows a 
breakdown of religious denominations used by Elazar and with which political culture 
they tend to be affiliated (Johnson, 1976). 
Table 1 
Classification of Major Religious Denominations 
by Political-C'ultural Leaning, According to Elazar 
Moralistic Individualistic Traditionalistic 
American Baptist Assemblies of God African Methodist 
Convention Episcopal Church 
Churches of Christ 
American Lutheran African Methodist 
Church Disciples of Christ Episcopal Zion 
Church 
Christian Reformed Eastern Orthodox 
Church Churches All Baptist bodies 
except American 
Church of Cluist, Evangelical United Baptist Convention 
Scientist ·Brethren 
Church of God 
Church of Jesus Christ Free Methodist 
of Latter-Day Church of God in 
Saints (Mormons) Lutheran Church- Christ 
Missoud Synod 
Congregationalists Church of the Nazarene 
(now United Church Lutheran General 
of Christ and db· Conference Evangelical United 
sident Congrega~ Brethren Church 
tional churches) Methodist Church 
Pentecostal Chwches 
Friends (Quakers) Methodist and Episcopal 
Presbyterian Church 
Jewish Congregations Protestant Episcopal in the United States 
Lutheran Church in Roman Catholic 
America 
United Lutheran Church 
Reformed Church in 
America Wisconsin Evangelical 
Lutheran Synod 
United Presbyterian 
Church in the USA 
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The innate character of political culture can be a confusing component of 
Elazar's model of political behavior. Political culture is directly influential in very few 
political situations but is beneficial in comparative studies because it serves as the rules 
for the game of politics. Political culture is the foundation upon which state, and more 
specifically, local government is built upon. Although Elazar repeatedly contends that 
the religious doctrine of particular religions and denominations are not responsible for 
government action, he argues that religious affiliation serves as an indicator for 
calculating the migration streams of the American population. The variable that may 
be most responsible for political culture begins with the original composition of the 
governments of the colonies under British rule. 
During the Colonial era, three types of colonies were established: royal, charter, 
and proprietary. The royal colonies were governed more closely by the King in 
England. The King appointed a royal governor to administer the government and . 
report back to the throne. The charter and proprietary colonies are sin1ilar in the nature 
by which they were established. The King granted groups of settlers or charter 
corporations the right to administer government. In contrast to the royal colony, these 
two types of governing systems allowed for more local control over administering the 
colonial government. The tumultuous rule of the British government caused for the 
governing establishments to change several times during the colonial era. Some 
charters were revoked, and the British government gave favor to some colonies over 
others. The attitudes and expectations of government during this era was not uniform 
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in all of the colonies. The events leading to the Revolutionary War are a testament to 
this fact. Some of the colonists preferred the traditional hierarchy of the royal 
goverrunent·and enjoyed the favorable reign of the king, while others in proprietary and 
charter colonies grew accustomed to their newly found liberty and freedom (Wood 
2003). The experiences of the settlers of the colonies are the seeds that sprouted to 
become political culture as described by Elazar. 
To explain the suggestion that political· culture serves as a guide for local 
goverrunent, Elazar mentions the use of symbols or heuristics that are unique to each of 
the political sub-cultures (1970). Concepts such as good goverrunent or policy, free 
market, and morality are several examples. It could become quite problematic when 
attempting to qualify certain terms into broad subculture categories. Some concepts fall 
into the classification of all three political cultures:. Terms such as liberty, or 
sovereignty could fall into such a category. Elazar mentions that there is definitely a 
particular political culture in the United States that is unique in the Western world, just 
as ihe entire continent of Europe has certain political. attributes that cross national 
borders but are exclusively European. Since the founding generation there has been an 
argument put forth that the United States has a unique culture but within that culture 
remains critical differences among the state populations. One must look no further than 
the Federalist Papers to find a very similar argument. 
The contributions of James Madison and John Jay are certainly more than can 
be afforded proper commentary at this time. However, their participation, along with 
Alexander Hamilton, in the ratification process of the United States constitution can 
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provide great insight regarding political culture in the United States. John Jay's 
description of American culture in Federalist No. 2 is one of a united people with 
common interests. Without further study, one may find that James Madison's 
description of factions within the political culture in Federalist No. I 0 is quite 
incongruous with the analysis given by Jay. On the other hand, if one studies the 
context of each essay the picture is quite clear that Elazar's model of political 
subcultures is indeed ·backed by founding· thought and American political theory and 
will be given further examination. 
The following excerpts are important to review in the original text in order to 
understand the existence of a broad American political culture that is distinct from any 
other in the world during the 18th century, and notwithstanding this unique culture, 
there is room still for noticeable differences within that culture. The first ·text is John · 
Jay's argument for a more centralized government under the constitution rather than 
loosely connected sovereign nations under a confederacy. The latter is James 
Madison's argument in favor of the constitutional structure that was designed to keep 
the states united while still giving the states space to manage their governments in the 
manner in which the people of each state deemed necessary. 
It has until lately been a received and uncontradicted opinion that the 
prosperity of the people of America depended on their continuing firmly 
united, and the wishes, prayers, and efforts of our best and wisest 
citizens have been constantly directed to that object. But politicians now 
appear who insist that this opinion is erroneous, and that instead of 
looking for safety and happiness in union, we ought to seek it in a 
division of the States into distinct confederacies or sovereignties. 
However extraordinary this new doctrine may appear, it nevertheless 
has its advocates; and certain characters who were much opposed to it 
formerly, are at present of the number. Whatever may be the arguments 
or inducements which have wrought this change in the sentiments and 
declarations of these gentlemen; it certainly would not be wise in the 
people at large to adopt these new political tenets without being fully 
convinced that they are founded in truth and sound policy. 
It has often given me pleasure to observe that independent America was 
not composed of detached and distant territories, but that one connected, 
fertile, wide spreading country was the portion of our western sons of 
liberty. Providence has in a particular manner blessed it with a variety 
of soils and productions, and watered it with innumerable streams, for 
the delight and accommodation of its inhabitants. A succession of 
navigable waters forms a kind of chain round its borders, as if to bind it 
together; while the most noble rivers in the world, running at convenient 
distances, present them with highways for easy communication of 
friendly aids, and the mutual transportation and exchange of their 
various commodities. 
With equal pleasure I have as often taken notice that Providence has 
been pleased to give this one connected country to one united people--a 
people descended from the same ancestors, speaking the same language, 
professing the same religion, attached to the same principles of 
government, very similar in their manners and customs, and who, by 
their joint counsels, arms, and efforts, fighting side by side throughout a 
long and bloody war, have nobly established general liberty and 
independence. 
This country and this people seem to have been made for each other, 
and it appears as if it was the design of Providence, that an inheritance 
so proper and convenient for a band of brethren, united to each other by 
the strongest ties, should never be split into a number of unsocial, 
jealous, and alien sovereignties (Rossiter 2003). 
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Jay's analysis gives the modern reader a quick definition of a nation with three · 
components: borders, language, and culture. The proposal that he makes is that the 
different states are comprised of people of similar beliefs. If one examines the time in 
which the Federalist Papers were written, this is entirely certain. No other society 
during that time argued for government that was based on the will of the people, albeit 
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through representatives. This is the broad political culture that Elazar refers to briefly 
prior to his explanation of political subcultures (1970). 
Madison's essay also refers to a broad political philosophy among the citizens 
of the states in the context of republican principles and serves as a perfect transition 
into a discussion of what he calls faction and Elazar describes as political subcultures. 
An excerpt of James Madison's Federalist No. I 0 reads: 
... [I]t clearly appears, that the same advantage which a republic has 
over a democracy, in controlling the effects of faction, is enjoyed by a 
large over a small republic,-- is enjoyed by the Union over the States 
composing it. Does the advantage consist in the substitution of 
representatives whose enlightened views and virtuous sentiments render 
them superior to local prejudices and schemes of injustice? It will not 
be denied that the representation of the Union will be most likely to 
possess these requisite endowments. Does it consist in· the greater 
security afforded by a greater variety of parties, against the event of any 
one party being able to outnumber and oppress the rest? In an equal 
degree does the increased variety of parties comprised within the Union, 
increase this security? Does it, in fine, consist in the greater obstacles 
opposed to the concert and accomplishment of the secret wishes of an 
unjust and interested majority? Here, again, the extent of the Union 
gives it the most palpable advantage. 
The influence of factious leaders may kindle a flame within their 
particular States, but will be unable to spread a general conflagration 
through the other States. A religious sect may degenerate into a 
political faction in ·part of the Confederacy; but the variety of sects 
dispersed over the entire face of it must secure the national councils 
against any danger from that source. A rage for paper money, for an 
abolition of debts, for an equal division of property, or for any other 
improper or wicked project, will be less apt to pervade the whole body 
of the Union than a particular member of it; in the same proportion as 
such a malady is more likely to taint a particular county or district, than 
an entire State. 
In the extent and proper structure of the Union, therefore, we behold a 
republican remedy for the diseases most incident to republican 
government. And according to the degree of pleasure and pride we feel 
in being republicans, ought to be our zeal in cherishing the spirit and 
supporting the character of Federalists (Rossiter 2003). 
Elazar's classification of political subcultures is threefold; moralistic, 
individualistic, and traditionalistic. He·argues that in order to understand how 
particular state governments react to the intergovernmental system, or 
federalism, one must first appreciate their responses in light of "I) the way in 
which the states' functioning as political systems influences the operation of the 
general government; and 2) the way in which the states- still functioning as 
political systems- adapt national programs to their own needs and interests 
(Eiazar I 984). In order to do so, one must understand the underlying political 
attitudes that shape the political system, or the political culture. 
The greatest distinction among the political subcultures is the 
conception of the political arena; that of the marketplace and the 
commonwealth. If society views the political arena as a marketplace, then 
individuals are most concerned with self-preservation and personal gaitl. If the 
idea of commonwealth is dominant, government is viewed in a positive light so 
long as policies and politics follows morally accepted principles for the 
betterment of society. Each of the three subcultures operates with different 
views of commonwealth and the marketplace with respect to concepts of 
· government, bureaucracy, and politics. Rather than providing an explication of 




Concepts Individualistic Moralistic Traditionalistic 
Government 
How viewed As a marketplace As a commonwealth As a means of maintaining the 
(means to respond efficiently to (means to achieve the existing order , 
demands) good community through 
positive action) 
Appropriate spheres of Largely economic Any area that will enhance Those that maintain traditional 
activity (encourages private initiative the community although patterns 
and access to the marketplace) nongovernmental action 
Economic development favored preferred 
Social as well as well as 
economic regulation 
considered legitimate 
New Programs Will not initiate unless Will initiate without Will initiate if program serves the 
demanded by public opinion public pressure if believed interest ofthe governing elite 
to be in public interest 
Bureaucracy 
How viewed Ambivalently Positively Negatively 
(undesirable because it limits (brings desirable political (depersonalizes government) 
favors and patronage. but good neutrality) 
because it enhances efficiency 
Kind of merit system Loosely implemented Strong None 
favored (should be controlled by political 
elites) 
Politics 
Pattems of belitif 
How viewed Dirty Healthy A privilege 
(left to those who soil (every citizen's (only those with legitimate claim 
themselves engaging in it) resp0nsibility) to office should participate) 
Pallems of participation 
Who should participate Professionals Everyone The appropriate elite 
Role of parties Act as business organizations Vehicles to attain goa1s Vehicle of recruitment of people 
(dole out favors and believed to be in the to offices not desired by 
responsibility public interest established power holders 
(third parties popular) 
Party cohesiveness Strong Subordinate to principles Highly personal 
and issues (based on family and social ties) 
Patterns of competition 
How viewed Between panies; not over Overissues Between the elite-dominated 
issues factions within a dominant party 
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Charles Johnson's critique ofElazar's theory of political subcultures concludes by 
strengthening the argument for an existing set of moralistic, individualistic, and 
traditionalistic political cultures within the United States (Johnson 1976). Johnson used 
discriminant analysis to configure a score of each of the political subcultures within 
each state. Johnson's discriminant analysis produced thirteen variations from Elazar's 
-original formulation; eleven individualistic states and two moralistic states. This 
distinction is not necessarily important to the current examination of Elazar's theory. 
The variations that are presented in Table 3 may explain some changes in religious 
affiliation within the states, but these changes may have followed the establishment of 
norms in state governments. 
Johnson argues that the differences in the subculture scores can be accounted 
for when examining the Roman Catholic religion. He contends that migration streams 
of various ethnic backgrounds within the Roman Catholic Church account for different 
cultural views. Irish Catholics and Spanish Catholics have different expectations for 
government and should not be considered in the same category. Additionally, analysis 
of Sharkansky' s 1969 study is explained. This scale is different from Elazar' s 
triangular model and it is suggested that a spectrum is more appropriate, with a state 
being either predominately moralistic or traditionalistic with individualistic 
characteristics somewhere in the middle (Johnson 1976). In contrast, Johnson's 
arrangement is based upon a single dimension of government intervention in social and 
economic affairs rather than the multivariate description ofElazar which includes 
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government activities, local emphasis in government, government centralization, 
innovative activity, enc?uragement of popular participation, popular participation in 
politics, importance of political parties, and party competition (Johnson 1976). 
Johnson used Elazar's description of the political cultures to formulate his 
hypotheses. For example, moralistic states were expected to score higher with respect 
to innovative governmental activities. When tested, six of Johnson's hypotheses 
regarding the variables mentioned above were statistically significant at .05 levels. As 
expected, moralistic states scored the highest with regards to government activities, 
local emphasis and administration of programs, innovative activity by the government, 
encouragement of popular participation in elections, popular participation in elections, 
and party competition. Meanwhile, traditionalistic states tended to score 10\ver in all of 
these areas. 
Johnson's conclusion is a defense of Elazar's theory against criticism that it 
does not provide sufficient utility in quantitative studies. Similar to the literature 
regarding direct and individual effects of economic variables on the political system, 
Johnson argues that political culture should be viewed in the same light. Political 
culture as a direct variable, an indirect variable, or a control variable does indeed 
provide utility in quantitative studies and can make a considerable contribution in 
explaining political behavior by individuals or government entities such as regarding 
policy implementation or program innovation. Typically, political culture is not used 
. . 
as a variable to explain state policies. Johnson argues that political culture should be 
used similarly to the use of economic and social control variables. Additionally, 
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political culture should be considered in studies regarding party politics. Johnson 
argues that differences in the. national Democratic Party and regional party differences 
in northern versus southern party structures could be better understood when viewed 
through the lens ofElazar's political culture (Johnson 1976). 
It is paramount not to exclude the fact that the total population is not included in 
the analysis of either Elazar or Johnson. Rather, only census records indicating 
religious affiliation are included so that the percentage of each population used to 
configure the political culture score is undefined. This method may produce some 
classification errors. By only using reported religious affiliations, a portion of the 
population is omitted from the study. Some more recent studies, such as that as 
discussed below by Morgan and Watson, have used data from national church 
databases. This would only seem to record the changes in religious affiliation over 
time. Not surprisingly, however, many of the states record similar religious affiliation 
scores in 1980 as compared to Elazar's data from the early 1900's. 
While most studies are trying to replicate Elazar' s work with a more complete 
set of religious data, the studies do not describe the origins of political culture. Elazar's 
.theory suggests that migration patterns were most important in establishing political 
culture because these views were transplanted from other regions of the country to 
establish norms in local government. A component of political culture that has not 
been examined has been the stability of social and group norms over time. Political 
science could greatly benefit from the work of psychologists such as Muzarfer Sherif. 
His revolutionary studies regarding social norms are considered classics in social 
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psychology. Sherifs theories emphasize the creation of social norms and how these 
attitudes can break through generational barriers. 1 
In 1991, Publius: The Journal of Federalism, examined the utility of Elazar's 
political culture research from an assortment of academic disciplines. The introduction 
to the symposium gives a brief description of the importance of Elazar's work within 
the context of several disciplines. Included in this volume was the work of Sheilah 
Morgan and David Watson titled, Political culture, political system characteristics, and 
public policies among the states. Similar to Johnson's study, Morgan and Watson use 
discriminant analysis based upon religious data. However, it is noted by the authors 
that there is significant difficulty in quantifYing religious affiliation as a variable to 
explain political behavior. This study rejected the scale used by Ira Sharkansky 
because this scale neglects Elazar's argument for three separate political cultures. 
Sharkansky' s work presents the individualistic culture as though it is a segway of 
progress between a traditionalistic culture and a moralistic culture. Morgan and 
· Watson rely on previous studies that show religious affiliation and religious institutions 
as "powerful carriers of cultural norms" (Morgan and Watson 1991 ). 
Four control variables were introduced along with political culture so that 
political culture was not examined in isolation. The control variables are: a measure of 
state affluence, industrialization, fertility, and state political ideology. Three groups of 
political and policy measures were treated as independent variables as shown in table 4. 




Morgan and Watson Dependent Variables 
Political Behavior Political Institution State Policies 
Interparty competition Legislative Per capita state revenue 
Voter turnout 
professionalism 
Per capita debt 
Policy relevance of state Staffing and spending 
political parties capability Tax effort 
Policy liberalism 
. The percentage of moralistic~ individualistic, and traditionalistic cultures was 
used to operationionalize the political culture of each state using the method of partial 
correlation along with the dependent variables to test the independent influence of 
political culture. They argue that political culture should be examined as a contextual 
force similar to the method in which many other sociological factors are studied. They 
then use regression equations to show the influence of political culture on public policy. 
The results of this study show several large changes in political culture over time due to 
migration patterns of the past century. Most notable, and not surprising, is the changes 
in ;tates such as Florida or Arizona. These states have had staggering population 
growth in the past fifty years; a pattern that continues today. Most states, however, 
retained roughly the same configuration of political cuiture. Their data shows that 
twenty-two of the forty-eight states are misclassified when using 1980 religious data 
from the National Council of Churches. This is similar to the results of Johnson's 
study, thus religious affiliation is defended as being a reliable proxy for the stability of 
political culture over time. The partial coefficients reveal expected results. Under the 
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influence of control variables the more moralistic a state is, the state produced higher 
scores of party competition, voter turnout, and more policy oriented political parties. 
Traditionalistic cultures showed the exact opposite of the moralistic states. The other 
two variable groups, political institutions and policy showed less significance than the 
political process variable group. However, traditionalistic states did prove to raise less 
money per capita, have lower levels of debt per capita, and generate less tax revenue. 
Most importantly for the current study, moralistic states engaged in more policy 
innova~ion while traditionalistic states had the lowest score in this category. 
Morgan and Watson's study shows that political culture has remilined a steady 
- . 
variable over a long period of time. Although this study is not a conclusive defense of 
Elazar's model, it does offer some explanation why states differ with regards to policy, 
politics, and governance. 
Comparative administrative law 
The· literature pertaining to comparative administrative law within the states, 
particularly with respect to state administrative procedure acts, is limited to only a few 
studies that are useful to the current examination of the relationship between political 
culture and state administrative procedure acts. · Inhibiting factors to accurate analysis 
of the acts include limited access to legislative history pertaining to each particular 
state, distinctive language that inhibits a cohesive understanding of procedural · 
requirements, and limited knowledge of how each state implements statutory language. 
regardless of similarities in language. However, the studies that are outlined in the 
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following pages are helpful in this analysis because they identify vital differences in 
which the states enact policy concerning the administrative process. 
In 1952, Ferrel Heady published one of the first comparative studies regarding 
state administrative procedure acts. State Administrative Procedure Laws: an 
Appraisal was described by the author as an incomplete analysis of the nature of the 
attempt to control the bureaucratic regulation process because only six states had 
passed expressed, although not exhaustive, administrative procedure acts: Arizona, 
California, Indiana, North Dakota, Utah, and Wisconsin. In addition to the legislation 
existing in each of these six states, the importance of the Model State AdministratiNe 
Procedure Act is also used in this comparison. 
The analysis that Heady presents is valuable to this study, but the historical 
review of the Model State Administrative Procedure Act (MSAPA) presents a valuable 
context which surrounded the first wave of administrative reform in state government. 
The MSAP A was drafted by The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform 
State Laws (NCCUSL) in 1946 and was similar to the federal Administrative Procedure 
Act which was signed into law by President Franklin D. Roosevelt the same year. The 
1946 MSAPA was revised in 1961. The 1961 MSAPA included more detailed 
processes than the original draft and the NCCUSL took three years to complete the 
draft. The language used in the I 96 I version of the MSAP A is broad enough that most 
states have incorporated much of the document into state law. In I 981, the, MSAP A 
·was revised yet again. The 1981 MSAP A is heavily detailed, and most states have not 
adopted many of the new provisions set forth (Bonfield 1986). The NCCUSL is 
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currently revising the MSAPA for the third time and a working draft is currently 
available. 
The aftermath of the New Deal policies created a groundswell of concern for 
the protection of the rights of individuals affected by regulatory actions of bureaucratic 
agencies. The efficiency of government that was sought out by Woodrow Wilson, 
· Leonard White, and others during the founding movement of public administration was 
the goal of legislation regarding public agencies, but the drive for efficiency was 
viewed as a legitimate threat to individual rights. Prior to the adoption of the Federal 
Administrative Procedure Act, the American Bar Association was the lead organization 
in pursuing legislative procedural statutes (Heady 1952). In 1941, the Attorney 
General's Committee on Administrative Procedure produced a minority of members 
who suggested comprehensive procedural statutes (Heady 1952). The opinion of the 
minority of this important committee was supported by the National Conference of 
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws when they published the first Model Act. It is 
. interesting to note .that many. states rejected the recommendation of uniform 
administrative procedure. 
Heady points to three key areas that were common in the existing APA's: 
rulemaking, adjudication, and judicial review. Although the Model Act was used as a 
guide for many states the implementation of the statutes passed have been quite 
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different. The original Model Act left many areas open for interpretation, and even 
areas to which a state could require more stringent standards? 
Rulemaking can be a complicated process that requires great attention and relies 
heavily upori the language presented in statutes. Although the administrative procedure 
codes of today are even more burdened with semantics, the acts in I 952 had varying 
approaches to rulemaking. Only Indiana and Ohio had provisions requiring formal 
rulemaking. TI1is · seems tell be an undermining aspect oLthe early administrative 
procedure acts because much of the emphasis placed by the American Bar Association 
was to protect those who would be affected by agency rules. The lack of requiring 
formal rulemaking could suggest that the early AP A's were a formality rather than 
strict provision to protect individual rights. 
Other demands suggested by the Model Act were considered in many states. 
Rulemaking calendars, publication of rules, and legislative/executive review are all 
subjects taken up by many states today. I11 the early AP A's only a few of the states 
adopted statutes requiring additional demands upon agencies, and in some occasions 
only one state attempted to experiment with additional requirements. Among Heady's 
descriptive analysis, the most important to this study is that he suggests studying the 
actual implementation ofthe.APA's rather than the language presented in the statutes. 
The example of North Dakota's implementation of a rule publishing requirement is 
very illustrative. At the time, each county clerk's office was required to keep a log of 
2 A thorough examination of the differences in implementation of the MSAPA has yet to be completed. 
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rules available for review by the public. This work was quite burdensome and could be 
delayed or neglected because most citizens would not be affected by most rules set 
forth by administrative agencies (Heady 1952). This could be an important insight 
relating to dominant political cultures where certain beliefs may be traditionally 
dominant among street level bureaucrats: 
Adjudication and judicial review can be reviewed in a similar manner 
concerning political culture. The differences in the state administrative procedure acts 
that are examined are mostly concerned with rulemaking provisions. Heady takes the 
other two components, adjudication and judicial review, and lends his suggestions for 
improvement. His analysis explains that most of the language concerning adjudications 
in state administrative procedure acts was "merely to insure conformity to accepted 
standards written into the statute" (Heady I 952). Hence, the Model Act sought only to 
strean11ine the existing procedure for adjudications. Innovation for judicial review is 
only different from adjudication in that states declined to adopt much of the Model Act 
due to preferences toward traditional judicial processes in each of the states. Heady's . 
analysis can be summed up by the following: 
Even here, however, the language tends to take on the coloration of 
the tradition in the state, and the language itself is much less 
important than that tradition. The actual scope of judicial review in 
a particular state cannot be determined by reading the words of a 
general statute on judicial review; knowledge in this area must come 
from examining the judicial working attitudes toward review of 
administrative action as revealed in a variety of case~ upholding or 
rejecting the decisions of administrative agencies (Heady 1952). 
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Heady seems to point towards the cultural differences among the states with 
regards to administrative law. The current study seeks to fill the void in the existing 
literature by suggesting that political culture, explicitly Elazar's theory, can assist in 
explaining the complex differences in state administrative law. 
A more modem· study of state administrative procedure acts was produced by 
Patty Renfrow and David Houston in 1987. This is perhaps the most comprehensive 
study regarding the differences in state APA's. Although Renfrow's description of the 
process surrounding the adoption of APA's in the states, as compared to Heady, there is 
much more quantitative analysis of rulemaking. The procedural requirements for 
adjudication and judicial review are still much more flexible than the Federal AP A, but 
many states have ''taken the lead over the federal government in structuring rulemaking 
discretion through generally applicable procedural statutes" (Renfrow and Houston 
1987). 
Renfrow and Houston acknowledge that state AP A rulemaking provisions are 
quite different despite suggestions put forward by the Model Act However, it is-
suggested that these variations are formed in a systematic manner. Five of ten 
components· utilized are whether the notice and comment process requires express 
terms, ability for public comment, opportunity to petition, whether the statute requires 
the agency to publish the statutory authority that authorizes the rule making action, and 
a state register of proposed rules. The other five components apply to tl1e review of 
rules promulgated by agencies. They include legislative/executive review, 
legislative/executive veto, required economic impact analysis, an annual review of 
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rules, and a rulemaking calendar. Table 5 shows all ten variables for each of the states 
(Renfrow and Houston ~ 987). 
Table 5 
Rulemekfng Provtaiona fn State Admtnfstratfve Procedure Acts 
flprrn tu!.Hc: 'etltle~~~ Stllutor')' Rtgtner hotsleUwe· L~lthtl•e- (COIIC.IC Atlnu11 lul~tt., , .. ., ,_, Alllllor-ttr h«UUYl' b..cutlq 14i~t JluiH C.l!"dlr 
llnlw , ... hiJSh ln'IW 
AhbiN {1!181)• • • • • • Aluta ( 95t) • • • • Ar!Jt"MM [1152) • • • 
""-'"'"' IH&11 • • , ..... '· ta It fctr~~l• I lt45l • • • • • • (DiorldO> (19g~ • • • • (OoMrcth:;ut (1 H) • • • • • • Dclw~te t197'J • • • ncrtll'• (1!1141 • • • • ~ar-9!1 fUH • • • • • llllw•lt 11962) • • • • • ld1ilc (1KS) • • • • lllfftCih (1975) • • • • lndl1n1 (IUS) • • I•• OV15J • • • • bnnl [1984) 
bntuc-y (1914) • ; Loulil•~ llN7) • • Mllnt 0978) • • • • • Mt')'hllcf (1951) • • • • • ~sucllusettn UiSt) • • • Mld\ltaR ("6J) • • • • • • Mlru-.111W (1957) • • • • • Kin''' lppol (1967) • • Hiucurrl pt15) • • • • • • • ~...,,, f 17ZJ • • • • .. bn.lh (lt7l) • • hub (IHS) • • • • • ~ ll•~htn (I!IJ'J) • • • • • • • 
linr .lVIII I'"'J • • • • • 1Ww Mi!liCO 19111 • • • • NN TOf'l (ttJ'C) • • • • • liortlt Cll'OIIN ~lill) • • • • • lbrth Dl•otll U U) • • Olio IUS)) • • • &\lab.,.. (1961) • • • ~PCI" f19S9) • • • Ptt~n1ylunl• pt78J 
Rbod1 h l1o11d I liZ • • • Soutll C1~1l'11 (19EDJ 
Sotltb D .. o~1 (1!66) • • • ... • .. hnnune I1174J • • • • Tm1 l1t75) • • • • • • Ulah (USll 
Yff9011t (19&8) • • Ylrghtlt (1975) • • • lluh1119t0'1 (Jts'J) • • • • • llo:st Ytrgl11h (lti1Z) • • • • llhColl\ In ll94ll • • • llra.t1119 (19!5) • ~ • • 
·,,lr l11ttl1l AlA"' •doSittd 
··~ lndlc:1lts the P"UIIte of • proviSion 
•.• lndltatel trl4! lobJII!"tt ol " pro.lslgtt 
Renfrow and Houston study rank states on ten components of the rulemaking 
process using a Guttman Scale of Analysis which provides a scale of "statute 
restrictiveness" (Renfrow and Houston 1987). Each component is given an ordinal 
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value of 1 if the restriction is found in the AP A and 0 if it is not. The highest score that 
can be attained is a ten with the lowest score being 0. The average score on this scale 
was 5.5 with Califomia being the only state to score a perfect 10, and three states, 
Pennsylvania, South Carolimi, and Utah scoring 0. Renfrow and Houston did not 




(Mean = 5.5) 
STATE SCORE STATE SCORE STATE SCORE 
caltfornfa 10 Texas 7 Vermont 5 
New Jersey 9 Alabama 6 Arizona 4 
Colorado 8 Georgia G Arkansa5 4 
Connecticut 9 Nevada 6 Delaware 4 
llllnofs 8 New York 6 Nen Mexico 4 
Louistana 8 Oklahana 6 Ohio 4 
Mi~souri 8 Oregon 6 VIrginia 4 
Montana 8 South Dakota 6 Kentucky 3 
Wiscon&in 8 Washington 6 Nebraska 3 
Alaska 7 ·we~t· Vi rginra· • 6 Rhode Island 3 
Florida 7 Wyoming 6 Mtssiss;ppf 2 
Idaho 7 Hat~ali 5 North Dakota 2 
l""a 7 Indiana s Pennsylvsnfe 0 
Hichlgan 7 Maine 5 South Carol ina 0 
Hi nne sot a 7 Haryland s Utah 0 
N.,. Hampshl re 7 Massachusetts s Kansas 
North Carolina 7 Tennessee 5 
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The summary of this study may also point to the impact of political culture in 
the adoption of APA's: " ... [W]e speculate that the rulemaking provisions of state 
AP A's reflect a temporal sequence: statutes first incorporate provisions of notice-and-
comment, then provisions of legislative-executive review, and veto and economic 
impact analysis, and finally provisions of annual rules review and rulemaking calendar" 
(Renfrow and Houston 1987). 
The current study hypothesizes that the more innovative states will be 
dominated by the moralistic political culture, while the traditionalistic cultures are slow 
to adopt AP A statutes and the least innovative regarding rulemaking and adjudication. 
It seems that states dominated by the individualistic political culture would be most 
willing to adopt provisions that have already been proven effective in other states. 
Traditionalistic cultures are similar to individualistic cultures in that they do not tend to 
be innovative and usually do not pass AP A statutes unless there is pressure from the 
people of the state or a national movelllent towards reform such as attempts to 
·professionalize state legislatures. 
Method 
A major problem that exists when studying political culture is quantifYing 
the utility ofEiazar's theory using traditional statistical methods. It is difficult to attain 
satisfactory results with regression analysis because when the states are divided into the 
three subcultures, the maximum number of cases is sixteen. This is hardly enough data 
to conclude any sort of correlation. Some studies, such as Morgan and Watson allude 
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to this fact when using partial correlation methods. A portion of their study was not 
even included in their discussion because there were only two Moralistic culture sets of 
data. This study admits the difficulty in using political culture as a proxy for 
determining political behavior because of limited sets of data. The utility of Elazar's 
theory, however, should not be ignored when studying public policy within the context 
of federalism. Many studies have used Elazar's model effectively at the state level 
when comparing policy decisions at the local level. Kentucky would be an ideal state 
to use political culture as an indicator of political behavior because there are 120 
counties in which to gather data. Identifying the utility of political culture at the local 
level allows for this study to analyze administrative law provisions in each of the states 
realistically despite the lack of satisfactory number of data sets on the state level 
because political culture has been proven to be a significant variable in determining 
policy choices at a local level. 
Many scholars would not react too kindly to the analysis given in this study 
because of the lack of statistical analysis, but a direct causal relationship is not sought 
in the first place. The main purpose of this study is to introduce an additional variable 
in the discussion as to why states adopt different public policies in addition to 
traditional political variables such as party competition, political participation, etc. with 
regards to federalism, in particular the differences in administrative law among the 
states. 
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The states have been separated based upon Elazar' s classification of the 
political subcultures that dominate each state. Table 7 shows the states that represent 
each political culture. 
Table 7 
~Moralistic Individualistic Traditionalistic 
California Connecticut Alabama 
Colorado Delaware Arizona 
Idaho Illinois Arkansas 
Iowa Indiana Florida 
Maine Maryland Georgia 
Michigan Massachusetts Kentucky 
Minnesota Missouri Louisiana 
Montana Nebraska Mississippi 
New Hampshire Nevada New Mexico 
North Dakota New Jersey North Carolina 
Oregon New York Oklahoma 
South Dakota Ohio South Carolina 
Utah Pennsylvania Tennessee 
Vermont Rhode Island Texas 
Washington Wyoming Virginia 
Wisconsin West Virginia 
Unlike previous studies, I chose to use Elazar's original calculation of political· 
culture rather than the results from discriminant analysis such as used by Johnson and 
Morgan and Watson or the formula oflra Sharkansky. I do not think that Sharkansky's 
scale, which ranges from 1 being purely moralistic to 9 being purely traditionalistic 
with individualistic being in between, is an appropriate tool for analysis because it does 
not reflect the differences in the three political cultures. Elazar explained that political 
culture should be examined as noted in table 8. 
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Using this formulation also creates difficulties for quantitative statistics. One 
could use a scale of one of the three cultures to determine a correlation, but this study is 
not looking to pinpoint a particular culture over the others. The focus here is again, to 
focus on the previous literature that point to the existence of these t_hree political 
cultures, and that political culture can serve as a variable in explaining the differences 
in policy decisions by state goverrnnents. 
Each division of political cultUre is examined using two criteria: date of passage 
and legislative restrictiveness. Some states have completely negated original 
Administrative Procedure Acts in favor of language more similar to the Model State 
Administrative Procedure Act. Some states that passed an AP A prior to the publishing 
of the MSAP A, such as Indiana, opted to revise the AP A to be structured similarly to 
the MSAP A. This study seeks to emphasize the actions of state goverrnnent with 
, ..... 
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regards to demand for reforming administrative law practices and innovative 
tendencies. So, I will be using the year where each state first adopted an 
Administrative Procedure Act. The year of passage for each state is examined on a 
time line where each state is tagged by the dominant political culture in each state. 
The second criterion that is examined is the scale of legislative restrictiveness as 
developed by Renfrow and Houston. Each state is given a score out of 10 
representing the existence 9f ten rulemaking provisions. This scale has not been altered 
and Kansas was omitted by Renfrow and Houston because of the state govermnent did 
not establish an Administrative Procedure Act until 1984 and their study was concluded 
in 1987. 
Hypotheses 
When one approaches this data from the viewpoint of Elazar's description of 
each political culture, several results are expected. First, moralistic cultures would be 
more likely to promote greater participation in govermnent. As far as the rulemaking 
process is concerned, public participation is expected by members of society above all. 
The moralistic culture also tends to have a favorable view of regulation. On the basis 
of Elazar' s theory one would expect moralistic cultures would score highly on the scale 
of restrictiveness an.d be among the first of the states to pass Administrative Procedure 
Acts. 
.. ,.": .. • 
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Traditionalistic states are by far the easiest states to predict in the context of 
regulatory behavior. The traditionalistic culture does not place a premium on public 
involvement in the government process. Government regulation is not deemed as a 
necessary component in traditionalistic states unless they are passed in order to protect 
the status quo of the political elites;· • The high priority that these states place on 
hierarchy and the status quo allow one to predict that they would score the lowest on 
the legislative restrictiveness scale and be among the last states to adopt Administrative 
Procedure Acts. 
Individualistic cultures are those states which are the most. difficult to gauge. 
with regards to Administrative Procedure Acts and public opinion towards regulation. 
These states should be in between the other two political cultures. Government, 
especially elected office, is viewed as a very ruthless arena where only professional 
politicians should be engaged. Regulation is not viewed as a necessary tool -of 
government unless it protects the private sector. In most cases, individualistic cultures 
would not be expected to value the regulatory process or the public involvement in the 
processes as would the moralistic cultures. The legislative restrictiveness scale shows 
the level of policy illllovation on behalf of the states, the individualistic states would not 
be expected to score as high as the moralistic states. 
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Discussion/Results 
Date of passage 
The mean of the year of passage for the three political cultures is as expected. 
The mean year of passage for the moralistic states is 1961, which is predictable because 
these states are expected to be more innovative and tend to view government more 
favorably as compared to individualistic and traditionalistic states. The mean year of 
. . '· ( ' "''"• 
passage for the individualistic states is 1967. These states are more pragmatic and less 
predictable than the other political cultures, but the mean year of passage falls in 
between the moralistic and traditionalist states as expected. The mean year of passage 
for the traditionalistic states is 1971. These numbers are noteworthy because each of 
the three categories has nearly the same number of states. The individualistic culture 
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Additionally, 1965 was a very important year with regards to new policies 
passed by the federal government. Growth of state government responsibilities due to 
creative federalism have been well documented m the federalism and 
intergovernmental relations literature (Walker 2000). This year marks the beginning qJ:: 
many policy requirements on state government. This development could be a reason 
for the sharp increase in administrative regulatory provisions. After the initial punch of 
the Great Society programs, state legislatures found great utility in administrative 
. · .. ' 
rulemaking because their workload was increasing at a very high rate. Of the 
moralistic states, nine had passed Administrative Pro~edure Acts prior to 1965 .. This 
suggests that over half of the moralistic states were working towards innovative 
administrative law procedures prior to the new responsibilities placed upon state 
govemments as a result of creative federalism policies during the Johnson 
administration. 
Individualistic states seemed to react more to the increased responsibility after 
the Great S~ciety. Only four states Ii.ad passed Administrative Procedure ·Acts prlor to 
1965. Traditionalistic states scored the lowest under this test as well. Only three states · ·• 
had passed Administrative Procedure Acts prior to 1965. Greater still, nine of the 
traditionalistic states did not pass legislation until after 1973. · 
Legislative Restrictive/less 
The following charts document the scale of legislative restrictiveness for 
moralistic, individualistic, and traditionalist states with the means scores being 6.1875, 
5.7142, and 4.9375 respectively. As expected, the traditionalistic states score the 
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lowest and the moralistic states score the highest. Half of the traditionalistic states 
scored five or lower. For the moralistic states, only four of the sixteen scored five or 
lower. The contrast of moralistic states to traditionalistic states is significant to 
acknowledge. 
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Traditionalistic Political Culture 
. ' 
Morgan and Watson argued that Assemblies of God and the Churches of Christ 
were misclassified by Elazar. They cite the history of each denomination and argue 
that they are more similar to traditional Pentecostal churches. For this reason, they 
place Assemblies of God and the Churches of Christ in the traditionalistic category 
rather than individualistic. They also argue that the Catholic church should be 
·'' . 
· · separated because differences in ethnicity and that there are considerable differences. 
b~tw~en Irish· Catholics and Hispanic Catholics. Similar to these arguments, I would 
like to discuss briefly the classification of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day 
Saints. This religious affiliation has been labeled as moralistic without much 
justification as to why. While I would agree that the church organizational structure 
resembles the moralistic culture in the way that the church community is set up, I 
would disagree that the churches parishioners have a similar view towards government 
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with other religious affiliations when considering political culture. T11e other 
denominations are used to track political attitudes that were established in the· 
development of state governments. The Mormon Church is the only church that was 
estab!Lshed and developed exclusively in the United ·states. For tliis reason,· it is . 
imperative to examine the changes in church doctrine over the past century. Attitudes 
and cultural norms within the church have changed drastically since the heavy 
migration of Mormon settlers to Utah. If one examines the voting patterns of the·· past 
half century of the state of Utah, one will find many similarities with traditionalistic 
·cultures with regards to political philosophy. If Utah is accepted as a traditionalistic 
culture due to the changes in church philosophy, the results of the legislative 
restrictiveness test changes considerably. The mean score from moralistic states 
increases from 6.1875 to 6.6 while the mean for traditionalistic states decreases from 
4.9375 to 4.6470. This is a significant change based solely on the single change in 
classification of the Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints as a traditionalistic culture. 
Conclusion 
There are vast similarities between states that have similar political cultures. 
The utility of Elazar' s model of political culture has been backed by the studies 
mentioned in this study as well as many others. The difficulty in operationalizing 
political culture for quantitative analysis should not mean that this theory be tossed 
aside. This study has sought, and found, intriguing relationships between states with 
similar political cultures regarding administrative governance. Political culture may not 
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be as much a factor in individualistic states, but the contrast between moralistic and 
· traditionalistic states should not be ignored. Policy innovation on behalf of the 
moralistic states and the disdain that is felt towards government in traditionalistic states 
reveal an important, but many times forgotten, characteristic of our governmental 
system. 
This study sought to see first, if these differences still exist. After analysis, it 
can be concluded that the states react to policy problems in many different ways. 
Religious affiliation has been a consistent variable for the past 100 years within the vast 
majority of states and it can be conceived that this consistency can be traced back to the 
founding era. It is possible that political culture could be traced back to the founding 
generation or beyond with consistency. The significance of the effect political culture 
has within state government alludes to the key principle of federalism which is state 
sovereignty. 
Federalism was the bond that allowed for the United States to exist as a union 
during the founding era. Scholars such as Morton Grodzins have argued that t.~e 
United States intergovernmental system has always been complex and cooperative, and 
that the system of dual federalism has never existed (Grodzins 1966). And, although I 
have realized the importance of Elazar's theory of political culture, I would disagree 
with his arguments about federalism. In American Federalism: A view from the states, 
he argues that the federal-state governn1ent relationship has always been that of 
cooperation and that the state governments are doing quite well simply because they 
still exist and are of considerable importance to the American intergovernmental 
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system (Elazar 1984) .. I strongly disagree. The structure of the Constitution provides 
state government considerable sovereignty and responsibility for public policy in a 
wide array of policy arenas. The trend of centralization through cooperative, creative, 
and even new federalism doctrines has placed an immense burden on state 
govemments. Some may argue that the federal government has an obligation to direct 
state governments in right direction. That may be true to a certain extent. The days of 
lassaiz-faire government are over, but state governments still react differently to·policy .. 
demands and these differences can be revealed through political culture and this is 
reflected through this examination of state administrative procedure acts. 
Attempts to reduce state sovereignty so that all state governments will function 
similarly have not had significant enough impact to eliminate the strength of t!Je unique 
approaches to government in the fifty states. Attempts such as the Uniform Law 
Commissioner's Model State Administrative Procedure Act have not reach the desired 
outcome of standardized policy among the states regarding administrative law. 
Scholars should pay more attention to the strength of stlt:: so\•ercigrtty as refleCted · '! 
t!Jough the consistency of political culture and the relationship between political culture 
and public policy. 
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